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Abstract  
 
The dominant view of what caused the crises in Thailand and elsewhere holds that local 
corruption in the form of “crony capitalism” is among the prime culprits.  This paper 
seeks to redirect focus away from the alleged crime of commission as a primary cause of 
recent crises toward the crime of omission in not interrogating more fully both the 
instability of finance capitalism and the resulting distributional consequences of that 
instability.  A comparison with the recent American experience suggests crises are an 
enduring feature of capitalism and not the product of “corrupt” Southeast Asian business 
practices.  This comparison suggests as well that redistribution of income over the course 
of such episodes may very well be quite regressive.  Together this perspective suggests 
that when western interest groups, exercising their influence through the international 
financial community, advocate for what is in essence a redirection of entitlements, 
questions of conflict of interest—arguably lying at the heart of the problem with  
cronyism—must be redirected as well. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Between 1980 and 2002, there were over 80 crises involving bank distress occurring in 64 
countries around the world (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2005); and these are but a subset of 
episodes marked by an extreme volatility in financial asset values.  Yet, not all such episodes have 
received the same degree of attention from the international academic and policy communities.  Of 
greatest concern have been the crises in Mexico (1994), Thailand (1997), Korea (1997), Indonesia 
(1997), Russia (1998) and Brazil (1998).  These crises, more than others, have both exposed 
international lenders to considerable financial risk and are alleged to have impeded economic 
development in the respective countries.   
In each case, the consensus opinion on the prime cause of these crises holds that 
exceptional circumstances lie at the root of the problems.  Indeed, as Grabel (1998:38) critically 
notes in her assessment of the later crises, “An interesting feature of the general crisis of 1997-8 
was the ubiquitous claim of exceptionalism that was again invoked to explain these events” [Italic 
original].  The dominant view of what caused these crises holds that local corruption in the form of 
connected lending or ‘crony capitalism’ is among the prime culprits.  Cronyism is synonymous 
with corruption in this literature and figures prominently among the alleged causes of the crises in 
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Thailand, Korea and Indonesia.  Non-performing loans traced back to Thai business connections, 
the Korean chaebols and Suharto’s family members are held out, in turn, as evidence of inadequate 
bank supervision and regulation. 
This paper disputes neither the existence nor the extent of the connected lending in these 
pre-crises economies.  It does, however, question the identification of these practices as the primary 
cause of the crises that followed.  The view that cronyism is the prime culprit of recent crises is 
problematic on at least two counts.1  One, it implies deceivingly that by eliminating cronyism we 
would reduce the risk of a financial crisis.  Two, by circumscribing the debate about causal 
influences to such “exceptional” practices, the labeling as ‘criminal’ of what is really public 
discretion in another form, it distracts attention away from systemic social injustices inherent in the 
experiences and thus distracts from the need to interrogate in much more detail the distributional 
consequences of what is a fundamental problem of unconstrained financial capital flowing in 
pursuit of an unbridled speculation—a problem that caused much greater devastation in the 
emerging and transition economies than it did when precisely the same phenomenon caused recent 
havoc in the American equity markets. 
The NASDAQ collapse in 2000 is rarely considered a ‘crisis’ and appears, on the surface, 
to be a distinctly different event from the recent Southeast Asian experience.  The NASDAQ 
collapse, it is argued, was only the bursting of a speculative bubble in equities.  It did not cause 
widespread macroeconomic havoc, presumably because there was apparently no comparable 
corruption since western banks are subject to sufficient regulation and oversight.  A comparative 
analysis suggests, however, that surface differences mask core similarities.  From a broader 
evolutionary and institutional perspective, the Thai crisis shares many elements in common with 
the 2000 NASDAQ market collapse.  Both occur in the wake of a structural transition, both are 
preceded by a substantial speculation that distorts the relationship between financial and underlying 
real wealth, both redistribute wealth in unintended and regressive ways, and neither stimulates 
much mainstream debate about how the adverse socio-economic consequences might better and 
more broadly inform the financial community’s approach to market regulation and crisis resolution.  
Little attention is paid to the differential socio-economic effects of the preceding speculation and 
subsequent collapse, flying as they do under the radar of aggregated macroeconomic analyses.  
This paper seeks to redirect focus away from the alleged crime of commission as a primary 
cause of recent crises toward the crime of omission in not interrogating more fully both the 
instability of finance capitalism and the resulting distributional consequences of that instability.  It 
acknowledges that connected lending practices in Southeast Asia privileged a group of asset 
holders but argues that rearranging allegiances by imposing a western style rule of law will not 
eliminate the acquisitiveness that caused the crises; rather such western-dictated changes will 
simply redirect the entitlements to those who, by western norms, are more deserving.  Evidence 
foreshadowing this redirection of entitlements appears in the manner in which the Thai crisis was 
resolved with domestic interests clearly subordinated to foreign lending interests in the assignment 
of resolution priority.  The questions then are, with a western-style financial system imposed, 
would the emerging economy be any less prone to crisis?  Are there issues of redistribution that 
might still concern us?  The comparison with the recent American experience suggests crises are an 
enduring feature of capitalism, and not simply the product of ‘corrupt’ Southeast Asian business 
practices.  And the need to interrogate the distributional consequences of all episodes of financial 
instability remains.  Together this perspective suggests that when western interest groups, 
exercising their influence through the international financial community, advocate for what is in 
essence a redirection of entitlements, questions of conflict of interest—arguably lying at the heart 
of the problems of cronyism—must be redirected as well. 
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Traditional Perspectives on Crime and Financial Crises 
 
Crony capitalism is usually thought of as “a system in which those close to the political 
authorities who make and enforce policies receive favors that have large economic value” (Haber 
2002:xii).  As the (then recently appointed) Deputy Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund described it 
 
Usually, these favors are not outright transfers of wealth (such as forgiving taxes or 
providing subsidies) but rather take place through provision of economic entitlements. 
These entitlements can take a variety of forms, but the ones that are most visible in the 
Asian crisis and the ones under discussion here normally entail ownership of a business 
or its operation.  Ownership may come about when cronies are favored as state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) are privatized. More frequently, however, economic entitlements have 
arisen by enabling the cronies—or, more accurately, the establishments they operate, 
which I shall call crony operated establishments (COEs)—to receive privileged access to 
governmental favors that have economic value. (Krueger 2002: 2) 
 
In this way, cronyism is linked directly to public corruption where public corruption has been 
defined as the “misuse of public office for private gain” (Svensson 2005: 20).   
Crony capitalism is inferior to competitive capitalism because, as Haber (2002: xvi), 
argues, crony capitalism encourages an inefficient allocation of resources, privileges those who do 
not deserve the benefits and thus distributes income in unjust ways.  Wei (2001: 16) captures the 
prevailing sentiment well: “Crony capitalism is a system in which connection trumps competence, 
and money supersedes merit”.  The ideological biases start to creep in with the label ‘cronyism’ 
and take solid root when associated directly with ‘corruption’   
 
It is easy to interpret the arrangement of entitlements normalized in this way in 
ideological terms.  When government official uses his discretionary authority to ask a 
foreign investor to contribute to this or that fund before approving a license to invest, that 
is corruption.  When the investor uses his discretionary authority to authorize investment 
to force a government to dismantle this or that regulation, that is not corruption. 
(Kennedy 2003: 25).   
 
A consensus opinion, supported by some case study and micro level evidence suggests that 
“corruption severely retards development” (Svensson 2005: 39) [Italic added].  Most broadly, 
domestic crony capitalism is associated with higher external loan-to-Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) ratio.  “Such a composition of capital flows has been identified as being associated with a 
higher incidence of a currency crisis” (Wei 2001: 15) and prevails allegedly because “corrupt 
countries” have difficulty attracting relatively stable FDI and are therefore more likely to rely on 
volatile international bank loans (Wei 2005: 17). 
In superior contrast, competitive capitalism allegedly encourages efficient resource 
allocation, avoids monopoly rents by privileging no one group of asset holders and distributes 
income in ways that are consistent with entitlements.  The belief that competitive capitalism is 
superior to crony capitalism rests on a number of assumptions that lack empirical support. 
 
Myth 1: Competition otherwise defines international trade and investment 
 
The causal attribution of the crisis to connected lending and the resulting advocacy for 
legal measures to discourage such behavior are consistent with the belief that competition will 
emerge as a preferred way of conducting business.  Krueger (2002) estimates that the inefficiencies 
resulting from state monopolies can lead to as much as 2.5 percentage point lower growth rate 
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under what would have otherwise been obtainable under competitive market conditions.  Yet, as 
Kennedy (2003: 24-25) reminds us 
 
rather few economic transactions are best understood as arms length bargains.  It turns 
out, for example, that the lion’s share of international trade is conducted through barter, 
internal administratively priced transactions, or relational contracts between repeat 
players.  The line between tolerable and intolerable differences in bargaining power—
between consent and duress—is famously a site for political contestation.  
 
Myth 2: Connected lending practices are socially and economically inferior to competitive arms 
length bargaining. 
 
Haber (2002: xvi) notes that the dependence on personal connections of asset holders and 
government officials are credible so long as the particular officials are in power.  Such dependence 
necessarily implies, he argues, that agents will operate with short-time horizons which in turn 
“cause cronies to demand higher rates of return for even projects that have short maturities.  It may, 
in fact, completely discourage long-term investing” (2002: xvi).  This problem of short time 
horizons is relative and the question of discouraging longer-term investing is even more critical 
when examining competitive, highly liquid financial markets. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Spotton Visano 2004), increased access to international capital 
markets encouraged by earlier liberalization initiatives, increased access to financing and yielded 
capital inflows equal to as much as 10 percent of GDP.  But the dramatic increase in the inflow of 
foreign capital was into debt instruments of shorter maturities, denominated in hard currencies.  
International borrowing at the shorter end of the maturity spectrum increased significantly the risk 
exposure of the domestic economy to external shocks such as fluctuations in foreign interest rates, 
exchange rate changes, and shifts in investor sentiment.  The liberalization initiatives did attract 
foreign funds, but most of it as large private inflows of ‘hot money’ seeking quick speculative gains. 
For the individual investor, the liquid nature of the short-term funds reduced total risk; but what was 
true for the individual could not hold true for the collective, as these crises proved yet again (also see 
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1999). 
The ease with which financial asset ownership may be transferred compounds the loss of 
control created by a partitioning of asset ownership with a relinquishment of ownership control.  
Liquidity, as the means to sell quickly an asset at close to current market price, shifts the temporal 
horizon of the owners of capital to a much shorter term.  Although the enterprise is itself a longer-
term venture, there are, in a system of financial capitalism, fewer longer-term individual 
stakeholders in its success.  Asset holders dissatisfied with the operation and direction of the firm 
or market are less likely to exert pressure to change and more likely to abandon the enterprise 
altogether by dumping their holdings.  The telescoping of investor horizons places a greater 
emphasis on current profits and current capital gains than would otherwise be placed.  The result is 
a greater impatience and shiftability of capital of the type stressed by John Maynard Keynes (1973 
[1936]). 
Contrariwise, many elements of “cronyism” are identical to the relationship banking 
practices that define the universal banking systems of Japan and Germany.  Relationship banking 
has long been recognized for its benefits in mitigating the asymmetric information and moral 
hazard problems that affect credit institutions (for example see Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 
1991).  Rather than shorten the investing horizon, personal relationships between lenders and 
borrowers may very well offer better information, provide more opportunities and longer-time 
horizons for side-payments and reciprocity, reduce monitoring costs, and make enforcement easier, 
(see Kang 2003). 
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Myth 3: Cronyism distorts prices 
 
The notion that corruption distorts prices and is thus inefficient suggests corruption 
imposes transactions costs that do not properly (in the sense defined by allocative efficiency) 
reflect opportunity costs of the transaction itself.  Prices in a corrupt regime are then allegedly 
higher than they would otherwise be by virtue of a concentration of power in the hands of 
government officials.  There is, however, no a priori basis on which to base such a conclusion.  
The argument assumes that differentiating between ‘normal’ and ‘distorted’ prices is a matter of 
observable, uncontested fact.  But as Kennedy (2003: 24) asks, “when is the state supporting a 
transaction by formalising it and when is the state burdening the transaction by adding unnecessary 
steps or costs?”  “And, just as sometimes what look like market distorting interventions can also be 
seen to compensate for one or another market failure, so what looks like corrupt local preferences 
can turn out to be efficient forms of price discrimination” (Kennedy 2003: 25).  The evidence is 
sparse, ambiguous and altogether incapable of supporting the allegation. 
 
Myth 4: Rents are unproductive incomes 
 
If, however, prices are in fact distorted then those receiving the income from such 
transactions are receiving monopoly rents extracted by virtue of their power to dispense 
preferential treatments.  Are these monopoly rents any less productive than those that will be 
extracted by foreign financial and business interests?  As Kennedy (2003: 24) asks, are these public 
figures “more or less likely to place their gains unproductively in foreign bank accounts than 
foreign investors?”  Kennedy (2003: 25) continues on to note  
 
Corruption becomes a code word for ‘rent-seeking’—for using power to extract a higher 
price than that which would be possible in an arms length or freely competitive bargain—
and for practices which privilege locals.  At this point, the anti-corruption campaign gets 
all mixed up with a broader programme of privitisation, deregulation, and free trade…and 
with background assumptions about the distortive nature of costs exacted by public as 
opposed to private actors. …there is no a priori reason for identifying public impositions 
on the transaction as distortions—costs of the transaction—and private impositions as 
costs of the good or service acquired. But the effort to treat corruption reduction as a 
development strategy substitutes a vague sense of the technical necessity and moral 
imperative for a “normal” arrangement of entitlements. 
 
The view that connected lending practices are ‘corrupt,’ which in turn causes crises, and that the 
crises impeded economic development together implies that by imposing the rule of law as a 
development strategy designed to eliminate corruption, crises would be avoided and economic 
development would be encouraged.  Proponents of this view are relying heavily on the rule of law 
to solve economic development problems most generally and to prevent crises more specifically.  If 
cronyism is not the root cause of crises, however, measures designed to prevent it will fail to 
deliver the desired stability. 
In the remaining sections, I review and compare key features of the Thai and NASDAQ 
episodes and illustrate how at a higher level of abstraction these two episodes share many elements 
in common with the cause of crises in finance capitalist systems and in this way challenge the 
exceptional explanation of the Southeast Asian crises.  This alternative view of the cause of crises 
suggests that not only is it doubtful that cronyism is the root cause of the Southeast Asian disaster 
but that in the absence of such behavior it is even more doubtful that the crises would have been 
averted.  
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The Financial Crisis in Thailand
2
 
 
From the mid-1980s onward, the rapid industrialisation and commercialisation of the Thai 
economy propelled Thailand forward in manner unmatched by that of the European, Japanese, or 
American economies at the time.  In 1990-1993, Thailand undertook a host of financial reforms 
designed to encourage foreign lending and portfolio investment.  Thai authorities removed 
restrictions on currency convertability, created an offshore banking facility, and removed stock 
market rules prohibiting foreign purchases of Thai equity.  Japanese and Western financial firms 
attracted to the relatively high rates of returns in Thailand, and repelled by relatively low rates of 
return at home, ‘generated a faddish enthusiasm’ for Thailand as an ‘emerging market’ and ‘Asian 
miracle.’  With the Thai currency pegged to the U.S. dollar and, more often, loans negotiated in 
foreign currencies, the currency risk of such investment was minimal.  The surge in financial 
inflows headed principally for the banks and arrived in the form of short-term bank loans.   
The economy quickly overheated with foreign debt reaching dangerous heights.  Capital 
inflows fed inflation, the Thai baht became overvalued, Thai products lost their international 
competitiveness, and Thailand’s balance of payments deficit increased to nearly half of its gross 
domestic product.  Over-investment in domestic infrastructure, heavy upstream industries and real 
estate generated overcapacity and falling returns.  By 1995, returns on real estate were falling and 
the debt default of the property firms threatened the solvency of the finance industry.  International 
speculation turned from lending on Thai development projects to undercutting the currency 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 2000: 2-3).  Unable to defend the attack, the baht was floated on 2 July 
1997.  In less than twelve months, the currency had lost half its value, wiping out Thai financial 
equity denominated in foreign currency.  Net private capital outflows were equivalent to nearly 
one-fifth of Thailand’s GDP, credit contracted, liquidity evaporated, production dropped, 
unemployment rose and economic conditions deteriorated unabated for eighteen months.  
Prior to the mid-1980s, a cartel of four to five major banks dominated Thailand’s major 
sectors.  As centres of ‘sprawling business conglomerates,’ the banks dominated first agri-business, 
then import-substituting consumer industries and basic process industries, and finally urban 
services.  In addition to Japanese foreign direct investment, these banks supplied the bulk of funds 
to support capital formation.  Close links between the business leaders and the politicians ensured 
the protection of the bank cartel until the 1980s energy crisis forced Thailand to adopt the World 
Bank’s export-oriented development strategy in exchange for temporary financial assistance.  With 
this external intervention came a ‘transfer of power over economic policy making into the hands of 
technocrats’ and, in the 1990s, a push to liberalize the financial system.  In 1990, restrictions on 
convertibility were removed; in 1993, an offshore banking facility was established to enable 
foreign lenders to lend in the Thai market.  In the same period, stock market rules changed to 
attract foreign investors, and encouraging Thailand’s direct access to foreign funds diminished the 
bank cartel’s influence.  Capital inflows surged. While portfolio investments increased, the vast 
majority of the new funds arrived in the form of loans.  Private-sector foreign debt increased 
tenfold.  By 1996, Thailand’s foreign debt was equal to approximately 70 percent of the Thai GDP, 
with over 60 percent of the total held in the private sector.   
Over this period, investment in agriculture declined, rural population migrated to the urban 
centres, and the export mix shifted from cheap labour industries, such as textiles, to technology-
based industries including computer parts, auto parts, and electrical goods.  Multi-national 
companies controlled the technology and focused on development for export, while domestic 
conglomerates focused on property development, services (finance, retail, and media), and 
infrastructure (roads, telecommunications, and power generation).  From 1993 onwards, foreign 
loans financed the domestic expansion, particularly in property development and 
telecommunications.   
With a pegged currency and a newly liberalized capital account, the government soon lost 
control of the macro-economy.  To prevent overheating, the monetary authorities raised interest 
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rates with every intention of restricting liquidity and slowing the rapid growth.  In the era of free 
flowing ‘hot money,’ however, the higher rates served only to attract more financial inflows in 
form of short-term, liquid loans denominated in foreign currencies—at the peak, more than 60 
percent of the foreign loans held a maturity of less than one year.  The percent of short-term foreign 
debt to foreign exchange reserves was well over 100 for the two years prior to the crisis in Thailand 
(see Ghosh 2001: 82). 
The substantial drop in the external value of the Thai currency combined with the distress 
that had spread to all sectors of the economy created a fire-sale opportunity.  Foreign direct 
investment again rose to dominate capital inflows through 1998 and 1999, but this time it was not 
for new investment but to acquire cheap assets.  At the beginning of 1997, Thailand had fifteen 
commercial banks and ninety-two finance companies; three years later, twenty-three finance 
companies remained in operation and all but the largest five banks had been closed, whose assets 
were transferred to the government’s Krung Thai Bank or sold to foreign financial interests.   
The crisis hit every sector of the Thai economy, and from the summer of 1997 through to 
the fourth quarter of 1998, real GDP fell 12 percentage points from its peak in 1996.  The non-
agricultural sectors were hit hardest; the construction industry did not begin to recover until the 
third quarter of 1999, and the finance industry was still contracting by the end of that same year.  
All indicators of employment problems showed a marked deterioration.  Unemployment rose from 
2.2 percent in 1997 to 5.2 percent in 1999, real average monthly wage rates fell 4.6 percent and 
average number of days seeking employment increased 22-50 percent in the same period, 
(Paitoonpong 2001: 7).  The number of people living below the poverty line increased by 8.3 
percent by one measure and 16 percent by another (Paitoonpong 2001:9).  While all suffered—with 
the incomes of a large number of people dropping below the poverty line—hardest hit were those 
at the top and bottom of the income scale, the poorly educated, and those in the rural northeast (the 
major source of city migrants) (Phongpaichit and Baker 2000: 95; see also Paitoonpong 2001).  
Studies of changes in national income distribution suggest an improvement since the crises 
generated the greatest losses for those at the top of the income scale; but to date the international 
transfers of income remain unmapped and so the question did the crises redistribute income from 
poorer eastern nations to richer western nations goes unanswered. 
The strategy adopted to manage the crisis specifically and intentionally sacrificed domestic 
economic stabilization in favour of international financial concerns. John McHale (1999) reports on 
the deliberations of Thailand experts, IMF officials, and academic researchers at a conference held 
under the auspices of the high-profile National Bureau for Economic Research 
 
The crisis management strategy was dictated by the belief that exchange rate stabilization 
should be the primary objective.  It was also believed that in an economy as open as the 
Thai economy, stabilization and the stimulation of real activity were not compatible in 
the midst of a crisis of confidence.  This meant that a liquidity squeeze and a contraction 
of real activity were unavoidable until the exchange rate stabilized.  As the exchange rate 
stabilized in early 1998, a more expansionary policy stance began to be pursued.  The 
move to economic stimulation was also aided by the good inflation performance and 
rapid turnaround in the current account, combined with the (not unrelated) greater than 
expected drop in real GDP growth. [Italic added] 
 
In addressing the question of whether or not a larger assistance package would have stabilized the 
economy sooner, the ensuing discussion (McHale 1999) clearly indicates the manner in which 
domestic concerns were further subordinated to foreign financial interests 
 
[A larger package] might also have bought more time to fix the financial sector.  He also 
stressed that when talking about bailouts it is important to distinguish the domestic and 
foreign investors.  He argued that the foreign creditors got bailed out
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package of reserves might have allowed more time to fix—but not necessarily bail out—
the domestic institutions. [Italic added] 
 
Not only were Thai interests subordinated in all key respects to international financial interests in 
the immediate resolution of the crisis, the conditions then imposed saw to it that this subordination 
would become structurally entrenched.  The foreign take-over in other industries, notably export, 
retail, and telecommunications industries, saw Thai ownership lost to Japanese, American, and 
continental European business interests.  Financial liberalisation destroyed the Asian form of 
entrepreneurial banking with potentially serious consequences for future national development.  As 
Phongpaichit and Baker (2000: 228-9) argue  
 
The international banks are likely to favour international firms because the systems and 
relationships are already in place. They will concentrate on consumer banking and risk 
management, where they have clear advantages through technology and experience.  
They are much less likely to take over the Thai banks’ old role of funding ambitious 
entrepreneurship on the basis of personal relationships and personal market knowledge. 
 
The NASDAQ Market Collapse 
 
In the 1980s, technological advance was radically altering the manner in which people 
communicated and managed information.  By the early 1990s, the personal computer was fast 
becoming required equipment for businesses and, later on, for households.  By 1997, the Internet—
as a means of accessing a large and ever-increasing amount of information—was familiar to many.  
From 1995 through to 1999, American real gross domestic product rose at a rate of 4 percent 
annually, driven by a total fourfold increase in business investment in computers and related 
equipment.  Companies at the heart of the advance as listed on the NASDAQ saw the index of their 
stock prices climb from a low of 600 in 1996 to a peak of more than 5000 in March of 2000.  Nine 
months later, the index had dropped to under 2300, wiping out nearly $5 trillion of paper wealth 
before sinking to a low of 800 in the late summer of 2002.  By comparison, the Wilshire 5000 Price 
Index—the broadest index of American share prices—declined by 26 percent over the same period. 
The NASDAQ market crash devastated the ‘new economy’ sector, venture capital dried up, 
banks experienced a sharp rise in loan losses, and the rate of business investment declined, turning 
negative a year later.  GDP growth dropped from an inflation-adjusted rate of 3.7 percent in the 
first half of 2000 to 0.9 percent in the second half.  Employment slumped with a severe and 
sustained decline occurring in manufacturing.  The economy entered a brief but severe recession in 
March of 2001 that ended 9 months later, leaving the real GDP growth at a mere 0.3 percent for 
that year. 
Speculation in the clusters of advances that mark the revolution in information and 
communications was itself affected by the innovations.  The innovations that defined the focus of 
the speculation and the advances altered the manner in which people speculated.  Trading directly 
in the stocks of Internet, computer hardware, and software companies was itself mediated by the 
computer.  The enhanced processing of data and the greater ease of access to that data fuelled an 
enthusiasm that propelled the NASDAQ index upwards, gathering an ever-greater number of 
investors.  At its peak, it is estimated that nearly 50 percent of Americans were participating in the 
stock market, up 10 percentage points from just three years earlier (see Hong, Kubik, and Stein 
2004).   
While the collapse of the ‘dot-com bubble’ resulted in a slowdown in the economy, the 
slowdown was short-lived and nowhere near as devastating as the Thai experience.  In its effort to 
counter the contractionary effects of the crash, the American central bank cut short-term interest 
rates by almost five percentage points in 2001.  The action successfully offset the balance sheet 
effects of loan losses on the banks’ portfolios and “spurred a rapid increase in core deposits, which 
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provided banks with plentiful, low-interest rate funding” (Bassett and Carlson 2002: 259).  The 
Fed-driven combination of lower interest rates and additional liquidity ensured that despite the 
economic slowdown, the U.S. commercial banking industry remained solvent and profits remained 
high in 2001.  This action combined with a smaller portion of the commercial economy relying on 
the banking system for credit helped to contain the depressing effects of the crash largely to the 
industries related to the initial advance.  
In the absence of widespread economic devastation of the type experienced in Thailand 
and elsewhere, the combined issues of price distortion and adverse income redistribution appear 
less severe.  The significant jump in participation combined with recent evidence of the skewed 
distribution of stock performance suggests, however, that the income redistribution inherent in the 
run-up and subsequent collapse of the NASDAQ market was regressive and prices were, at least by 
ex post criteria, distorted.  Recent research by Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2004, 2005) suggests that 
herding by individual investors distorted equity prices from that which would have prevailed if 
institutional investors alone had dominated trading and that stocks “heavily bought by individuals 
subsequently underperform stocks heavily sold by 4.4 percentage point annually.”  This result 
supports previous evidence that individual investors lose money by trading in markets with large 
institutional investors.   
 
Comparisons 
 
The US NASDAQ market collapse, which occurred in a developed equity market, did not 
result in wide scale bank failures and so had (fortunately) only minimal drag on the 
macroeconomy; it appears on the surface completely different from the earlier Thai disaster.  
Appearances are, however, deceiving.  Significant innovation spurring large-scale restructuring, an 
enthusiastic speculation in the assets related to the source of the restructuring, and emerging 
imbalances between the real and financial sectors that ended in a sharp, unexpected reversal of 
fortune characterized both episodes.  Moreover, both crises may well have involved significant 
regressive income redistribution that to date remains largely unmapped.   
In the late twentieth century, the American economy was in the midst of a transition to 
what some have called the information age.  An increasing number of businesses in all industries 
were becoming dependent on the computer as a means of storing, processing, and delivering 
information.  By the end of the century, personal computers, together with the Internet, were fast 
becoming a household necessity.  The technology was altering (and continues to alter) all manner 
of economic and social interaction.  Speculation in NASDAQ-listed stocks was speculation focused 
on the assets directly related to these advances.   
Similarly, transitional restructuring marked the 1990s Asian ‘miracle’ economies, only 
here it appeared in the conversion from a centralized political structure, with industrial 
development and financing directed by the nation-state, to an increasingly diffuse market-oriented 
system.  Innovation as it affected these societies appeared less in the form of internally induced 
technological change leading to industrial development and more in the form of economic and 
political restructuring.  An outward looking development policy focused not on importing cheap 
raw materials but rather on attracting relatively cheap funds for internal development and adoption 
of foreign technologies.  The need for foreign exchange to service the foreign debt drove the search 
for external markets in which to sell final goods and services produced.   
The degree of uncertainty about the eventual material outcomes of each transition was 
profound.  When the outcome of an innovation is unknown and unknowable, collective influence in 
defining the anticipations of advance intrudes.  Shared opinion of the potential for advance 
influences the degree of actual speculation and thus the extent to which funds are available to 
finance the innovation.  If the extent to which the promise of an innovation may be realized is 
dependent on the available funding, the increased funding will ensure initial advance and further 
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feed the speculative enthusiasm.  Without any objective future information on which to base 
anticipations of speculative advance, speculators can only have extrapolated from recent past 
events, reinforced by the observation that others were of the same mind and shared the same 
opinions.  Observing that others share the same optimistic opinion reinforces the speculator, further 
encouraging the speculative optimism and resulting activity.  In a roundabout manner, then, 
uncertainty with respect to the innovation’s future material outcome opens the door to collective 
influence through the individual’s reliance on the shared opinion of others.  Where the speculative 
activity itself materially affects the innovation’s potential, the material outcome becomes 
dependent on the collective assessment of the potential outcome. 
In this environment, interpretations of what is economically justified and what is 
‘excessive’ become extremely vague, disputable and disputed.  The American debate between 
Congress and then Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan over the combined question 
of financial imbalances and the Fed’s obligation to address them are now legendary (see Greenspan 
1996; Hayford and Malliaris 2005).  In the wake of the NASDAQ collapse, it is now widely 
acceptable to describe the preceding run-up of stock prices as a ‘bubble.’  Such consensus was, 
however, conspicuously absent prior to March of 2000.  
Speculative bubbles occur when “competitive bidding, motivated by repetitive and self-
fulfilling expectations of capital gains, drives up asset prices in excess of any reasonable value for 
the asset” (Spotton and O’Hara 1999:1079-1080).  Upon bursting, distress selling replaces the 
bidding excesses such that “price fluctuations are greater than they would have been in the absence 
of a speculative bubble, and such bubbles are evidence of destabilizing speculation” (Spotton and 
O’Hara 1999: 1080). 
Before the collapse, the nature of the innovations and the widespread restructuring that 
resulted made it unclear whether there was in fact a bubble.  Could not, instead, the run up in asset 
prices be reflecting “a profound and fundamental alteration in the way our economy works that 
creates discontinuity from the past and promises a significantly higher path of growth than we have 
experienced in recent decades” (Greenspan 1998)?  Only in hindsight, once states of confidence 
and investment potential are fixed are we able to look back and clearly identify excesses.   
 Similarly, only in retrospect were the critical vulnerabilities of the Thai banking system 
apparent.  As late as the summer of 1997, multilateral institutions and international investors were 
equally bullish on Southeast Asian prospects despite the fact that banks were borrowing in foreign 
currency denominated, short-term debt, but lending in domestic currency for long-term, illiquid 
infrastructure projects (see Allen et al. 2002).  Indeed, had the currency not fallen as much as it did, 
had interest rates risen by less, the banking sector would not have been weakened so.  
Finally, while income in Thailand appeared to become more equally distributed in the 
wake of the crisis, the embedded transfer of wealth from national to foreign interests remains 
unmapped and ill defined but potentially significant.  To date, we have little more than 
ideologically based arguments that allegedly confirm the rightfulness of that transfer.  Where the 
stock market wins and losses of the type generated with the NASDAQ run-up and subsequent 
collapse is, some would argue, a zero-sum game taken together, it is the potential for a significantly 
regressive redistribution of that income that to date escapes critical inquiry. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As I describe elsewhere (Spotton Visano 2006), the essence of capitalism as an economic 
process lies in its continual adaptation to innovation and its perpetual reconfiguring of the matrix of 
the inputs of land, labour, and physical capital and the outputs in the production of services and 
material goods.  Driven by the socially constructed need to accumulate wealth, innovation and its 
associated investment become the engines of economi
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Finance capitalism is a form and dimension of capitalism characterized by the impersonal 
transfer of contracts, evidencing claims to wealth and defining the particular means by which the 
individual speculates on that growth.  The formal financial institutions that characterize finance 
capitalism are those institutions that provide the means of transferring wealth and purchasing 
power from suppliers to users of funds.  Formal financial institutions include the contractual claims 
on wealth, the markets in which to trade these claims, and the legal entities, such as banks, whose 
primary business is defined—in both function and by a portfolio of assets—by the process of 
creating and transferring credit.   
These institutions of finance capitalism, by offering the speculator a means of lowering the 
perceived risk of loss from investment and speculation, encourage, in turn, innovations in non-
financial capital.  In the partitioning of an asset’s value in the manner afforded by joint stocks, for 
example, funding innovation becomes easier.  With only part ownership of an innovative asset, the 
required financial commitment of the individual speculator is lower.  Where the claims to part 
ownership are tradable, the ability to extract that commitment becomes potentially easier.  By 
creating an easier means by which to speculate in the tangible innovations, financial institutions 
have encouraged the speculative supply of funds available to support non-financial innovation and 
have thus promoted investment in the non-financial innovation itself.  Increased accessibility, 
together with increased liquidity, may not only increase efficiency by ensuring that for a given 
exchange fewer resources are expended to transact it, but may also encourage even greater savings, 
investment, and accumulation and thus an even greater expansion of the capitalist system.  The 
institutions of finance capitalism can therefore be growth inducing.   
If this indeed best describes a pre-crisis Thai economy that might have prevailed in the 
absence of cronyism, then conclusions about corruption and the resulting retardation of 
development might well be justified.  Arguably, however, this was not the case.  Thailand was 
undergoing a massive economic restructuring in the transition to a more market-oriented economy 
with a wider industrial base.  Comparable to the American restructuring spurred on by innovations 
in the information and communications technologies, the material outcomes and economic 
potential were unknown and unknowable, consequently dependent on collective opinion, and thus 
indeterminate.  In such a circumstance, speculation proceeds solely based on extrapolated 
expectations, which we know to be destabilizing (see Frankel 1996).  
Although the institutions of finance capitalism exist generally to reduce uncertainty and do 
so insofar as they structure in predictable manner the means by which the system creates and 
transfers credit, these same institutions will at times encourage the unbridled, self-reinforcing, and 
ultimately destabilizing speculation in revolutionary innovations.  The speculation will ultimately 
distort prices (in the sense captured by the common notion of a speculative bubble) by driving a 
wedge between financial and real wealth.  When supported by credit flowing through the banking 
system, as was the case in Thailand, the subsequent collapse can be devastating.  The problem 
however for policy makers seeking to intervene is that ex ante we have no way of knowing even 
vaguely that point in the prior enthusiasm when the speculation becomes unsustainable.  The 
interdependency of speculation and outcomes means that any combination of speculation and 
outcomes could be sustainable under different states of confidence.  Not until after the destabilizing 
speculative enthusiasm has subsided are we be able to look back and identify that point in time 
when financial asset prices outpaced underlying real values and thus identify when the supporting 
debt became unsustainable.   
Endogenously, therefore, speculation via financial claims on underlying real wealth creates 
its own fragility in a manner akin to the instability discussed by Minsky (1982).  This endogenous 
fragility implies that an economy in the early stages of a speculation may be able to withstand a 
shock of a given magnitude, but that same shock could eventually fracture the system.  The crisis is 
then not in terms of “excess” speculation.  Neither is it necessarily or strictly in terms ‘excess’ 
lending.  Instead, the crisis is simply—but importantly—the inability of the capitalist system to 
withstand periodically economic shocks.  The speculative inclinations of investors and the ability 
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of the financial system to accommodate and support the speculation with credit creation are both 
common features of capitalism.  Crises, then, are the outcome of precisely the same behaviour that 
capitalism rewards and encourages and by which we define the culture of capitalism.  The Thai 
crisis differed from the NASDAQ experience by only a matter of degree.   
To date, efforts to minimize, if not prevent, crises of the type occurring in Thailand have 
focused on strengthening bank regulation and oversight, by which is meant imposing western-style 
portfolio regulation.  The belief is that such laws will prevent the cronyism that allegedly caused 
the 1997 crisis.  This paper has argued that not only is it questionable that cronyism caused the 
crisis but suggests that eliminating it will not avert further such episodes.  With comparative 
reference to the recent American experience, core similarities provide evidence of the fact that 
periodic crises are an inherent element of finance capitalism.  While the form and degree of crises 
differ from episode to episode, key elements of a fundamental instability prevail in finance 
capitalist systems.  The facile reference to law as a panacea overlooks the fundamental properties 
of capitalism and the ontological foundations of law which are both imbricated and implicated 
therein. 
Crises and their resolution appear to entail significant adverse redistributions of income but 
these effects remain as yet incompletely mapped and here we have a crime of omission.  With very 
few exceptions, consideration of the systemic injustices inherent in the crises and the speculation 
that precedes them, have been absent.  In default of any imminent wholesale replacement of the 
prevailing socio-economic structures, the onus is on analysts to critically examine the evolving 
income redistribution over the course of such episodes.  Critically examining who wins and who 
loses—as shaped by both the crisis and range of possible crisis management strategies, explicitly 
informed by notions of distributive justice, in full view of all potential conflicts of interest—is 
among the most pressing of challenges still facing us. 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
_______________________ 
1 A third concern, but one that lies beyond the scope of this paper, is the fact that identifying connected 
lending with corruption demonizes key persons and practices and in so doing simplifies detrimentally the 
complex phenomenon of institutional transition.  Elsewhere I (Spotton Visano 2006) have argued that kinship 
networks in non-market economies are functionally similar and comparably effective to the business 
networks in market-based systems.  As economies shift from the informal to the more formal market based 
system, we see trust and loyalty embedded in kinship ties replaced by exchanges between unknown 
principals.  In Thailand, the rapid externally stimulated economic transition was not matched by a 
comparable transition in internal customs.  Juxtaposed against the alleged objectivity of foreign financial 
transactions, the kinship ties defining the informal Thai networks appeared subjective and corrupt.  
2 The summaries of Thai and NASDAQ experience draw heavily on those offered in Spotton Visano (2006). 
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